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Fulton County Superior Court
***EFILED***LS
Date: 1/22/2019 7:20 AM
Cathelene Robinson, Clerk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION
STATE OF GEORGIA

PREMIER PORFOLIO 2, LLC,
Plaintiff,
CIVIL ACTION NO.
20 l 8CV3 l 0460

V.

ABS INVESTOR, LLC, ABS PREFERRED
EQUITY MEMBER, LLC, and ACADIA
REALTY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,

Bus. Case Div. 2

Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

The above styled action is before the Court on Defendants ABS Investor, LLC ("ABS
Investor"), ABS Preferred Equity Member, LLC ("ABS Preferred"), and Acadia Realty Limited
Partnership's ("Acadia Accountant") Motion to Dismiss. Having considered the pleadings and
argument of counsel at a January 16, 2019 hearing in this matter, the Court finds as follows':
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
According to the Verified Complaint and Petition ("Complaint") of Plaintiff Premier
Portfolio 2, LLC ("Plaintiff'), in 2015 Plaintiff and ABS Investor formed Broughton Street
Partners Company II, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company ("BSP II"), as owners and CoManaging Members.2 BSP II was established "for the purpose of acquiring, owning, developing,
redeveloping, financing, operating, leasing, managing, and disposing of unique real-estate assets

In briefs and oral argument to the Court regarding Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the parties referred to
allegations and documents not contained in the pleading. However, when considering the motion the Court has
limited its review strictly to the pleadings.
2
Complaint, 111.

in Savannah, Georgia. "3
On April 20, 2015, Plaintiff and ABS Investor executed an operating agreement for BSP
II that was amended June 20, 2016.4 On November 4, 2016, the operating agreement was again
amended (as last amended, the "Operating Agreement") when ABS Preferred was admitted as its
third member. Under the Operating Agreement, Plaintiff and ABS Investor remain Co-Managing
Members of BSP II and each owns a 50% common membership interest in BSP II while ABS
Preferred owns a 100% preferred membership in BSP II.5
The Operating Agreement includes a Buy-Sell provision ("Buy-Sell Option") under
which either Co-Managing Member can buy or sell its membership interests from or to the other
Co-Managing Member under a procedure that contemplates a hypothetical sale of BSP II's assets
and a calculation of the resulting distribution each member would receive on account of their
respective percentage interest in accordance with the terms of the Operating Agreement.
Specifically, the Buy-Sell Option provides in part:
14.03 Buy-Sell.
(a) In the event of a Deadlock between [Plaintiff] and [ABS Investor] as to
a dispute or at any time after the second anniversary hereof, either CoManaging Member may put its Membership Interest (and in the case where
[ABS Investor] shall include the Membership Interest of [ABS Preferred])
to the other Member (an "Offer") ...
(b) The Offer shall (i) be in writing and signed by Offeror and (ii)
specify a cash purchase price (the "Offer Price") at which the Offeror
would purchase all of the Company assets if such Company assets were
free and clear of all liens, claims, and encumbrances. A copy of the
Offer shall be delivered to the Company Accountant or, if none, a certified
public accounting firm, who shall, within 10 days, determine and notify

the Members of the amount that the Offeree would receive (the
Complaint, ,rt I.
Complaint, ,r 12, Ex. A (Operating Agreement), p. I, Recitals at ,r,r 1-2.
Complaint, if13; Operating Agreement, Art. I, Definitions at p. 4. The Operating Agreement is to be
governed under the laws of Delaware and specifically the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act. See Operating
Agreement, § 19.0 I.
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"Offeree Value"; which in the case where [ABS Investor] is the Offeree
shall include [ABS Preferredj) and the amount that Offeror would

receive (the "Offeror Value"), on account of their respective Percentage
Interests in the Company and any loans made by them to the Company, if
( 1) all Company assets were sold for the Offer Price, (2) all tax allocations
were made as required in the Operating Agreement, (3) all liabilities of the
Company (including any loans made by any Member or its Affiliates to the
Company), were paid in full and (4) the remaining proceeds were
distributed to and by the Members in accordance with this Agreement. Each
Member shall cooperate fully with the Company's auditor or certified
public accounting firm, as applicable, in connection with its effort to
determine the Offeree Value and the Offeror Value.
(c) Offeree shall have the right, exercisable by delivery of written notice
(the "Buy Election") to Offeror within 60 days, after the receipt of the
Offer, to elect to purchase all of Offeror's Membership Interest in the
Company, and in any loans made to the Company by Offeror and its
Affiliates, for a cash purchase price equal to the Offeror Value.

If Offeree fails to give Offeror notice of Offeree's Election within such
time period, Offeree shall be deemed to have made an election to sell
(the "Sell Election") all Offeree's Membership Interest and interests in
any loans made to the Company (which in the case where [ABS Investor]
is the Offeree shall include the Membership Interest and interests in any
loans made to the Company of [ABS Preferred]) for a cash price equal to

the Offeree Value. 6
On July 30, 2018, ABS Investor invoked the Buy-Sell Option by sending Plaintiff an offer
letter with an "Offer Price" of $16.25 million ("Offer" or "Offer Letter" as appropriate). 7 That
same day Acadia Accountant, acting as BSP II's "Company Accountant",8 sent Plaintiff a letter
stating in part: "Pursuant to Section 14.03(b) of the Operating Agreement, and in connection with
the Offer Letter, the undersigned, as the Company Accountant, hereby determines that the Offeree
Value is $0.00 and the Offer Value is $6,216,952.00" ("Acadia Accountant Calculation").9

6

Operating Agreement, § I 4.03(a)-(c) (emphasis added).
Complaint, ~35.
Section 9.03 of the Operating Agreement provides: "(ABS Investor's] affiliate shall handle the accounting,
tax returns and reporting for which it shall receive a fee of 1% of the gross revenue collected at the Properties,
rayable monthly in arrears."
Complaint, ~36.
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Plaintiff alleges the Acadia Accountant Calculation is incorrect and that-under a
"Waterfall" provision in the Operating Agreement which governs the distribution of Net Capital
Proceeds'f=-given an offer of $16.25 million the correct Offeror Value is $4,876,508 and the
correct Offeree Value is $1,325,317. Plaintiff further asserts that despite repeated requests,
Defendants have "refused to explain" the Acadia Accountant Calculation (specifically the
Offeror Value and Offeree Value under the Waterfall provision) or to provide documents and
other information necessary to understand the calculations.11 According to Plaintiff, the parties
exchanged various communications regarding the disputed calculations and, in a September 10,
2018 letter, ABS Investor took the position that it "invoked the [Buy-Sell Option] with the
justified intention of offering [PlaintiffJ no monetary consideration for its interest in BSP II."12
Plaintiff alleges Defendants intentionally manipulated the Buy-Sell Option in an attempt
to deprive Plaintiff of its rights to receive any value for its membership interests in BSP II. Based
on these allegations, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment declaring that: "[G]iven the Offer
Price of $16.25 million, Plaintiff has the right to sell its membership interests in BSP II for an
Offeree Value of $1,325,317 under a correct interpretation of the Operating Agreement's
Waterfall and to be paid that amount in accordance with the Operating Agreement's terms."
(Count I asserted against all Defendants). Additionally, Plaintiff asserts claims for: breach of
contract (Count II asserted against ABS Investor and ABS Preferred); breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count III asserted against ABS Investor and ABS
Preferred); breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV asserted against ABS Investor); and aiding and
abetting breach of fiduciary duty (Count V asserted against Acadia Accountant).

10
II
12

See Operating Agreement,§ 12.0 I (b).
Complaint, iJ39.
Complaint, il45
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ANALYSIS
A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss
[A] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted should not be sustained unless (1) the allegations
of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not
be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in
support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant
could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought. If,
within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be
introduced which will sustain a grant of the relief sought by the
claimant, the complaint is sufficient and a motion to dismiss
should be denied.
Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308,309, 800 S.E.2d 366,368 (2017) (citing Anderson v. Flake, 267
Ga. 498, 501, 480 S.E.2d 10, 12-13 (1997)). Further, "[w]hen the sufficiency of the complaint is
questioned by a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted, the
rules require that it be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with all doubts
resolved in his favor even though unfavorable constructions are possible." Cobb Cty. v. Jones
Grp. P.L.C., 218 Ga. App. 149,152,460 S.E.2d 516,520 (1995) (citation omitted).
Under the notice pleading procedure of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, only "[a] short
and plain statement of the claims" is required. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(a)(2)(A). See Wright v.
Waterberg Big Game Hunting Lodge Otjahewita (PTY), Ltd., 330 Ga. App. 508, 510, 767
S.E.2d 513, 516 (2014) ("[T]he Georgia Civil Practice Act requires only notice pleading and,
under the Act, pleadings are to be construed liberally and reasonably to achieve substantial
justice consistent with the statutory requirement of the Act. Pleadings serve only the purpose of
giving notice to the opposing party of the general nature of the contentions of the pleader, and
thus general allegations are sufficient to support a plaintiffs claim for relief') ( citing Racette v.
Bank of Am., N.A., 318 Ga. App. 171, 180, 733 S.E.2d 457,465 (2012)).
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Nevertheless, "a complaint must give a defendant notice of the claim in terms
sufficiently clear to enable him to frame a responsive pleading thereto." Patrick v. Verizon
Directories Corp., 284 Ga. App. 123, 124, 643 S.E.2d 251,252 (2007) (citing Allen v. Bergman,
201 Ga. App. 781, 783(3)(b) (1991)). See Cleveland v. MidFirst Bank, 335 Ga. App. 465, 465,

781 S.E.2d 577, 578 (2016) ("[A] plaintiff is not required to plead in the complaint facts
sufficient to set out each element of a cause of action so long as it puts the opposing party on
reasonable notice of the issues that must be defended against").
B. Conclusions of Law
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue the Complaint should be dismissed in its
entirety for three reasons: (1) Plaintiffs request for declaratory relief is contrary to Delaware
law, is not supported by the Operating Agreement, and is moot, (2) Plaintiffs claims for
monetary relief against ABS Investor and ABS Preferred are precluded by an "exculpatory"
provision in the Operating Agreement, and (3) the Complaint fails to state a claim under
O.C.G.A. §9-l l-12(b)(6) for Counts II through V. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
a. Request for Declaratory Relief
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs response to ABS Investor's $16.25 million Offer was a
rejection of the Offer and that it constitutes a counteroffer. Specifically, Defendants contend
Plaintiff materially varied the terms of the Offer by proposing a new Offeror Value of
$4,876,508 and a new Offeree Value of $1,325,317 rather than accepting the Acadia Accountant
Calculation. The Court disagrees.
It is an elementary principle of contract law that an acceptance of an offer,
in order to be effectual, must be identical with the offer and unconditional ...
'It is, of course, elementary that where a contract is sought to be made in the
form of an offer and an acceptance, there is no meeting of minds unless the
acceptance is of the identical thing offered. If the acceptance be not coextensive with the offer, then before the offerer [sic] can be said to have
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become bound, he must have indicated in turn his assent to the modified
acceptance.'
Friel v. Jones, 42 Del. Ch. 148,151,206 A.2d 232, 233-34 (1964), aff'd, 42 Del. Ch. 371,212
A.2d 609 (1965) (citing Foreman's Sys. v. Milk Dealers' Crate Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 351, 120 A.
358,360 (1923)). See Ramone v. Lang, No. CIV.A. 1592-N, 2006 WL 905347, at *10 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 3, 2006) ("Delaware, which has adopted the mirror-image rule, requires that an acceptance
be identical to the offer") ( citations omitted).
Here, an offer made under the Operating Agreement's Buy-Sell Option must expressly
"specify a cash purchase price (the "Offer Price") at which the Offeror would purchase all of the
Company assets if such Company assets were free and clear of all liens, claims and
encumbrances.v':' Thus, ABS Investor's Offer was to purchase BSP II's assets for $16.25
million.14 The Offeree Value and Offeror Value are not an offer per se but rather are calculations
flowing from the Offer Price which are to be determined by the "Company Accountant" pursuant
to the express terms of the Operating Agreement.

Although Plaintiff took the position that the Acadia Accountant Calculation is incorrect,
stated what it believes to be the correct calculation, and requested additional documents and
information to understand the Acadia Accountant Calculation, such does not constitute a
rejection of Defendants' Offer Price. See Eikon King St. Manager, L.L.C. v. LSF King St.
Manager, L.L.C., 109 S.W.3d 762, 767 (Tex. App. 2003) (under LLC agreement's buy-sell
procedure which invoking-offeror member initiates by delivering notice to offeree member with
a "Stated Amount" representing price at which it would purchase all assets of the company as if
it were a hypothetical sale, and agreement then sets a formula for calculating the value of each
member's interest based on the hypothetical sale, finding offeree member's acceptance of Stated
13
14

Operating Agreement, § 14.03(b ).
Complaint, ~35.

7

Amount but challenge to methodology and accuracy of offeror member's calculations of the
value of each member's interest was authorized under the agreement). Indeed, to the extent
Plaintiff sought a "correct" calculation of the Offeree Value and Offeror Value flowing from the
$ I 6.25 million Offer under the terms of the Operating Agreement, it sought to enforce the

parties' agreed-upon formula for determining such values. Compare PAMI-LEMB I Inc. v.
EMB-NHC. L.L.C., 857 A.2d 998, 1013-15 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("The court finds that the totality of
[the general partner's] response to the Buy/Sell Notices was so inconsistent with the clear terms
of the partnership agreements it constitutes either a repudiation of those contracts or an improper
counteroffer"; holding the general partner repudiated those agreements by stating it would
perform only on terms different therefrom and finding its "responses" to limited partner's offer
under a buy-sell clause, when considered in the context of the general partner's contemporaneous
statements that it would not agree to perform waterfall calculations under the agreements,
constituted a counteroffer).
It follows that when faced with Defendants' Offer Price and the Acadia Accountant
Calculation which Plaintiff believed to be incorrect under the Operating Agreement's Waterfall
distribution formula and in light of Defendants' alleged refusal to provide additional information
and the parties' inability to resolve the dispute, Plaintiffs only apparent recourse was to seek
assistance from the courts to declare the parties' rights. See O.C.G.A. §9-4-1 ("The purpose of
[the Declaratory Judgment Act] is to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to rights, status, and other legal relations; and this chapter is to be liberally construed and
administered"); Mariner Healthcare, Inc. v. Foster, 280 Ga. App. 406, 410, 634 S.E.2d 162, 167
(2006) ("Georgia's declaratory judgment act is to be construed liberally, and all that is required
to state a claim for declaratory judgment is 'the presence in the declaratory action of a party with
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an interest m the controversy adverse to that of the petitioner'") (citing RTS Landfill v.
I.

Appalachian Waste Systems, 267 Ga. App. 56, 63(3), 598 S.E.2d 798 (2004)). ~

Defendants also assert that by withdrawing or revoking the Offer Defendants have
rendered moot Plaintiffs' claims.16 Plaintiff, in turn, alleges the Buy-Sell Option is in the nature
of a firm offer that must be held open to the Offeree for 60 days.17
Delaware adheres to the 'objective' theory of contracts, i.e. a contract's
construction should be that which would be understood by an objective,
reasonable third party. We will read a contract as a whole and we will give
each provision and term effect, so as not to render any part of the contract
mere surplusage. We will not read a contract to render a provision or term
"meaningless or illusory. A contract must contain all material terms in order
to be enforceable, and specific performance will only be granted when an
agreement is clear and definite and a court does not need to supply essential
contract terms. When the contract is clear and unambiguous, we will give
effect to the plain-meaning of the contract's terms and provisions.
Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1159-60 (Del. 2010) (citations, footnotes, and
internal punctuation omitted)
Here, the Buy-Sell Option provides: "Offeree shall have the right, exercisable by
delivery of written notice (the "Buy Election") to Offeror within 60 days, after the receipt of

the Offer, to elect to purchase all of Offeror's Membership Interest. .. for a purchase price equal
to the Offeror Value" but "[i]f Offeree fails to give Offeror notice of Offeree's Election within
such time period, Offeree shall be deemed to have made an election to sell (the "Sell Election")
all Offeree's Membership Interest.. .for a cash price equal to the Offeree Value." Reading the
Operating Agreement as a whole and under an objective reading of the Buy-Sell Option, if an

15

See Newstrom v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 343 Ga. App. 576, 578- 79, 807 S.E.2d 50 I, 503 (20 l 7) ("When a
choice-of-law question arises in a contract action brought in Georgia, substantive matters such as the validity and
construction of the contract are governed by the substantive law of the state where the contract was made (or is to be
performed, if that is a different state); but procedural and remedial matters are governed by the law of Georgia, the
forum state"; holding declaratory judgment action concerning a dispute over the effect of a general release and the
method of resolving that dispute "involve[d] procedural and remedial matters governed by Georgia law").
16
Defendants' Verified Answer to Complaint and Petition ("Answer"), Fourth Defense and iJ53.
17
Complaint, iJ26.
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Offeree has the "right" to make a Buy Election and such right is "exercisable ... within 60 days,
after the receipt of the Offer", it logically follows that the offer must remain open during that
period. Defendants' construction of the Buy-Sell Option would not give effect to an Offeree's
express "right" thereunder and would, in fact, render an Offeree's right to make an election
during the 60-day period illusory. See O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287
(Del. 2001) ("Contracts are to be interpreted in a way that does not render any provisions
"illusory or meaningless") (citations omitted). Insofar as ABS Investor's Offer had to remain
open for a period of 60 days, the purported withdrawal of the Offer would be ineffective and
would not render Plaintiffs claims moot.
Additionally, Defendants assert that to the extent Plaintiff seeks a declaration that it is
entitled to "be paid [$1,325,317]", the declaratory judgment claim fails because §14.03(d) of the
Operating Agreement expressly limits a seller's damages to two percent of the purchase price in
the event the buyer fails to close on the purchase. Section §14.03(d) provides in pertinent part:
Immediately after the Buy Election or Sell Election, as applicable, the
purchaser under this Section shall deposit in escrow with a title
company ... a deposit in cash in an amount equal to two percent (2%) of the
purchase price to be paid. The undersigned expressly acknowledges that if
the purchaser fails to close such purchase as provided herein, the seller will
suffer damages that, although substantial, will be difficult if not impossible
to quantify. Accordingly, in such event the seller may retain the earnest
money deposit as liquidated damages and not as a penalty.18
The Court finds the above language clear and unambiguous. Upon a buyer's failure to
close a purchase per the Buy-Sell Option, a seller "may" but is not required to retain the earnest
money deposit as liquidated damages. See Oracle Partners, L.P. v. Biolase, Inc., No. CIV.A.
9438-VCN, 2014 WL 2120348, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2014), aff'd, 97 A.3d 1029 (Del. 2014)
(interpreting language in corporation's bylaws, finding use of the word "may" in the context

18

Operating Agreement, §14.0J(d) (emphasis added).
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used could only be interpreted as permissive rather than mandatory). Moreover, the Operating
Agreement contains a provision that expressly makes the parties' rights and remedies
cumulative:
The rights and remedies provided by this Operating Agreement are
cumulative and the use of any one right or remedy by any party shall
not preclude or waive the right to use any or all other remedies. Such
rights and remedies are given in addition to any other rights the parties
19
may have by law, statute, ordinance or otherwise.
Thus, §14.03(d) does not ultimately preclude or limit the declaratory relief sought m the
Complaint or Plaintiffs other claims.
Given all of the above, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs declaratory judgment
claim is hereby DENIED.
b. Exculpatory Provision
Defendants assert Plaintiffs claims for monetary damages against ABS Investor and
ABS Preferred are barred by an exculpatory provision contained in §5.03(b) of the Operating
Agreement. As noted by Defendants, Delaware law allows members of a limited liability
company to limit their potential liability to the company or other members:
A limited liability company agreement may provide for the limitation or
elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract and breach of
duties (including fiduciary duties) of a member, manager or other person to
a limited liability company or to another member or manager or to another
person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company
agreement; provided, that a limited liability company agreement may
not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a
bad faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
Del. Code Ann. Title 6, § 18-ll0l(e).
Here, §5.03(b) of the Operating Agreement provides:

19

Operating Agreement, § 19.07 (emphasis added).
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No Member shall be liable to the Company or to the other Member for any
loss or damage sustained by the Company or any of its Members unless

such loss or damage shall have been caused by intentional misconduct,
fraud, a material misrepresentation or a knowing violation of law or a
transaction for which such Member received a personal benefit m
violation or breach of the provisions of this Operating Agreement. 20
In its Complaint, Plaintiff expressly alleges:
[ABS Investor's] conduct and [ABS Preferred's] participation in
manipulating the Buy-Sell Option involves intentional misconduct, fraud, a
material misrepresentation, or a knowing violation of law in connection
with a transaction for which [ABS Investor] and [ABS Preferred] expect to
receive a personal benefit in violation or breach of the provisions of the
Operating Agreement, within the meaning of section 5.03(b) of the
Operating Agreement."
Indeed, throughout its pleadings, Plaintiff alleges Defendants have acted in bad faith and
in concert to intentionally manipulate the Buy-Sell Option to deprive Plaintiff from receiving any
value for its membership interest in BSP II.22 Under Georgia's notice pleading procedure, the
Court finds Plaintiff has at least stated a claim for monetary damages against ABS Investor and
ABS Preferred notwithstanding the exculpatory provision.

c. Counts II through V
i. Breach of contract (Count II)
"Under Delaware law, the elements of a breach of contract claim are: (1) a contractual
obligation; (2) a breach of that obligation; and (3) resulting damages." Interim Healthcare. Inc. v.
Spherion Corp .. 884 A.2d 513, 548 (Del. Super. Ct.),

aff'd, 886 A.2d

1278 (Del. 2005) (citing

H-M Wexford. LLC v. Encorp. Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 144 (Del.Ch.2003).
Here, Plaintiff alleges Defendants ABS Investor and ABS Preferred breached the
Operating Agreement: "by failing to cooperate with Plaintiff in purporting to exercise the Buy-

20
21
22

Operating Agreement, §5.03(b) (emphasis added).
Complaint, 148.
Complaint, 11 I, 48, 71
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Sell Option, preventing Plaintiff from cooperating with the Acadia Accountant in determining
the Offeree Value for Plaintiffs interest in BSP II, and interfering with the calculation of the
Offeree Value for Plaintiffs interest in BSP II; and "by encouraging, adopting, and approving
the Acadia Accountant's improper calculation of the Offeror Value and Offeree Value."

23

Defendants argue that the breach of contract claim fails because the Operating Agreement
expressly limits ABS Investor's and ABS Preferred's duties to certain enumerated acts, none of
which Plaintiff alleges they breached. Further, they assert that, in the case of ABS Preferred, the
Operating Agreement expressly provides that it owes "no fiduciary duty of disclosure or other
duty to any other member or to the Company" and that it is entitled to act in its sole discretion
even if such actions conflict with the interests of BSP II or Plaintiff. The Court is not persuaded.
Although §5.02(a) of the Operating Agreement limits ABS Investor's "powers, duties,
and obligations" to certain enumerated acts and, with respect to ABS Preferred, §5.05 eliminates
any fiduciary duty of disclosure or other duties to the other members or to BSP II to the fullest
extent permitted by law, both provisions are subject to the other express terms of the Operating
Agreement. See Operating Agreement at §5.02(a) ("[ABS Investor's] powers, duties and
obligations shall be limited to the following and to the powers, duties and obligations
otherwise specifically granted to or imposed upon [ABS Investor] in this Operating
Agreement") (emphasis added); id. at §5.05 ("To the fullest extent permitted by law, and except
as otherwise specifically provided herein, [ABS Preferred] shall have no fiduciary duty of
disclosure or other duty to any other Member or to the Company ... " ( emphasis added).
With respect to the Buy-Sell Option, the Operating Agreement expressly states: "Each
Member shall cooperate fully with the Company's auditor or certified public accounting firm, as

23

Complaint, 160.

13

applicable, in connection with its effort to determine the Offeree Value and the Offerer Value."

24

Further, the Operating Agreement has a "Cooperation" clause that provides:
The Members agree that they shall provide all cooperation reasonably
requested by the other party in connection with the activities contemplated
by this Operating Agreement, including (i) making available appropriate
officers and employees, on reasonable advance notice, and (ii) executing
25
and delivering any certificates or documents."
Having considered the pleadings and given the above, the Court finds Plaintiff has at
least stated a claim for breach of contract. Defendants' motion to dismiss the contract claim is
DENIED.

ii. Breach of the implied covenant ofgoodfaith andfair dealing (Count III)
Under Delaware law,
[t]he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every
contract and requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from
arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the
other party to the contract from receiving the fruits' of the bargain. The
implied covenant cannot be invoked to override the express terms of the
contract. Moreover, rather than constituting a free floating duty imposed on
a contracting party, the implied covenant can only be used conservatively to
ensure the parties' reasonable expectations are fulfilled. Thus, to state a
claim for breach of the implied covenant, [a plaintiff] must allege a specific
implied contractual obligation, a breach of that obligation by the defendant,
and resulting damage to the plaintiff. General allegations of bad faith
conduct are not sufficient. Rather, the plaintiff must allege a specific
implied contractual obligation and allege how the violation of that
obligation denied the plaintiff the fruits of the contract.
Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings. L.L.C., 971 A.2d 872, 888 (Del. Ch. 2009) (citations, footnotes, and
internal punctuation omitted).
Here, with respect to its claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, Plaintiff adopts and incorporates its previous allegations and further alleges that the
Operating Agreement "impose[s] a duty of good faith and fair dealing on [ABS Investor] and
24
25

Operating Agreement, §14.03(b).
Operating Agreement, §5.10.
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(ABS Preferred] in the performance of their contractual obligations", and that they "have
breached and will continue to breach this duty ... by violating their contractual obligations to
Plaintiff."26 Defendants contend Plaintiff's allegations are too vague and conclusory to state a
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. However, when
considered in the context of Plaintiff's breach of contract claim and, in particular, in light of
Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants acted together to manipulate the Buy-Sell Option and
impeded Plaintiff's attempts to obtain a proper calculation of the Offeree Value and Offeror
Value under the terms of the Operating Agreement, the Court finds Plaintiff has at least stated a
claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Wright, 330 Ga.
App. at 510 (Under the Georgia Civil Practice Act, "(p]leadings serve only the purpose of giving
notice to the opposing party of the general nature of the contentions of the pleader, and thus
general allegations are sufficient to support a plaintiffs claim for relief') ( citing Racette, 318 Ga.
App. at 180(4)). Defendants' motion to dismiss this claim is DENIED.
iii. Breach of fiduciary duty (Count IV) and aiding and abetting breach of
fiduciary duty (Count V)
Under Delaware law, "[a] claim for breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of two
elements: (1) that a fiduciary duty existed and (2) that the defendant breached that duty." Beard
Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 601 (Del. Ch.), ajfd sub nom. ASDI, Inc. v. Beard
Research, Inc., 11 A.3d 749 (Del. 2010). A claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary
duty has four elements: "(i) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (ii) a breach of the
fiduciary's duty, (iii) knowing participation in the breach by the non-fiduciary defendants, and
(iv) damages proximately caused by the breach." In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d 54, 80 (Del.
Ch.), decision clarified on denial of reargument sub nom. In re Rural Metro Corp. Stockholders

26

Operating
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Litig. (Del. Ch. 2014). Further, Delaware law permits a limited liability company to restrict the
fiduciary duties owed by members and managers to the company or to other members. See Del.
Code Ann. Title 6, § 18-1 l0l(c) ("[T]he member's or manager's or other person's duties may be
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company agreement").

See also Kagan v. HMC-New York, Inc., 94 A.D.3d 67, 72, 939 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2012) ("[W]ith
these provisions the agreement imposes only specific limited contractual obligations on the
managers, thus eliminating the traditional fiduciary duties imposed under Delaware law;
expressio unius est exclusio alterius").
Here, Plaintiff asserts "[ABS Investor], as one of BSP II's Co-Managing Members, owes
fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and disclosure to the other Members, including Plaintiff' and
that such duties "extend to its responsibilities with respect to BSP II's accounting matters."27
Further, Plaintiff alleges ABS Investor "breached its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff, intentionally
and in bad faith, by manipulating the Buy-Sell Option in a calculated effort to reduce the Offeree
Value, to enrich itself at Plaintiffs expense, and to deprive Plaintiff of its membership interests
in BSP II at an improperly calculated Offeree Value of $0", allegedly causing it to suffer
damages.28 With respect to its aiding and abetting claim, Plaintiff adopts and incorporates its
prior allegations and further alleges Acadia Accountant "knowingly participated in [ABS
Investor's] breaches of its fiduciary duties to Plaintiff', allegedly causing it to suffer damages.29
Although, as noted above, §5.02(a) of the Operating Agreement limits ABS Investor's
"powers, duties, and obligations" to ce11ain enumerated acts, given that such includes acts related
to BSP ll's accounting functions and it light of Plaintiffs assertions regarding the allegedly
coordinated efforts of Defendants to intentionally and improperly manipulate the Buy-Sell Offer
27

28
29

Complaint,~~ 69- 70.
Complaint,~,[ 71- 72.
Complaint,~~ 73-75.
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to their benefit, the Court does not find that the breach of fiduciary claim is duplicative of the
contract claim or that the pleadings disclose with certainty that Plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support thereof. See Schuss v. Penfield
Partners, L.P., No. CIV.A. 3132-VCP, 2008 WL 2433842, at *10 (Del. Ch. June 13, 2008)
(Although these fiduciary duty claims share a common nucleus of operative facts with
[p]laintiffs' breach of contract claim, they depend on additional facts as well, are broader in
scope, and involve different considerations in terms of a potential remedy"). The motion to
dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims is
DENIED.
CONCLUSION
Having considered the pleadings and given all of the above, the Court hereby DENIES
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

SO ORDERED this 22nd day of January, 2019.

BETH E .. LONG, S
IOR JUDGE
County Superior Court
Business Case Division
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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